COUNTRY INFORMATION AND
EVIDENCE ASSESSMENT
IN NEW ZEALAND
COI in Judicial Practice -
Budapest
13-15 April 2011
Rodger Haines, QC1
INDEX
Statistics
THE REFUGEE AND PROTECTION DETERMINATION
SYSTEM IN
NEW ZEALAND - PAST AND PRESENT
A
brief history
Domestic
incorporation of CSR, CAT and ICCPR
A
two-tier determination system
Responsibility
to establish claim
An
individualised assessment and the limitations to COI
An
inquisitorial process
High emphasis on
credibility of claimant
Only publicly
available information
Classified
information
Confidentiality
maintained
Challenging
a
decision of the IPT
ACCESSING COI - THE RRIB
Advantages of a
specialised research unit
Language barriers
Cooperation
between COI researchers and decision-makers
APPROACH TO COI - TRIBUNAL LEVEL
Disclosure
Consistent
interpretation of COI
COUNTRY GUIDANCE
CASES
Country guidance
cases - some conclusions
Country guidance
to be distinguished from precedent setting decisions on the law
THE
LIMITATIONS OF COUNTRY INFORMATION - COI AND CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT
A few
observations about credibility assessment
A few
observations about assessing the credibility of COI
CONCLUSION
TABLES
[1] This paper aims to
provide an overview of the way in which country information (COI) has
been used and assessed in the New Zealand refugee status determination
system, a system which from 29 November 2010 was enlarged beyond the
Refugee Convention (CSR) to include claims to complementary protection
under the Convention against Torture (CAT), Article 3 and under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Articles
6 and 7 as well as to claims for humanitarian protection.2
The
primary focus of the paper is on the use of COI at the appellate
level.
[2] In New Zealand there are
presently no formal processes or rules for determining substantive
quality standards for researching and assessing COI.3
To date
little to nothing has been written on the subject.4
But as will
be seen, this does not mean that quality standards are absent from COI
in the New Zealand context. Nevertheless it is true that there has been
no data collection or research of the kind recently carried out in the
United Kingdom.5 The enhanced protection
responsibilities now
undertaken by New Zealand under CSR, CAT Article 3, ICCPR Articles 6
and 7 and general international human rights law in the context of
humanitarian claims do not permit it to be assumed that what has worked
in the past will suffice in the new regime.
[3] In the absence of qualitative
research into how COI is presently used by the major actors in the New
Zealand refugee and protection system (claimants, refugee and
protection officers at first instance, members of the appellate
tribunal and by members of the judiciary on review), the observations
and comments which follow must necessarily be seen as a largely
subjective introduction to the issue of COI and evidence assessment in
the New Zealand refugee and protection system. That system is
outlined under the next heading.
Statistics
[4] New Zealand is a small country
with a population of approximately 4.5 million. The Tables at the
end of this paper provide a very general overview of the number of refugee claims received in the
period 1991 to 2010 by the formal two-tier RSD system. It will be
seen that in the first year of its operation (1991) some 901
applications were received, rising to 1124 in the following year.
This level was not seen again until 1996 (1064), 1997 (1534) and 1998
(1784) with a peak in 1999 (2019). Since then there has been a
steady decline. In 2005 the number was 399 and in 2010,
384. The tables also show the recognition rate at both first
instance before the Refugee Status Branch (RSB) of Immigration New
Zealand and on appeal to the Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSAA)
(now disestablished and replaced by the Immigration and Protection
Tribunal (IPT)).
THE REFUGEE AND
PROTECTION DETERMINATION
SYSTEM IN
NEW ZEALAND - PAST AND PRESENT
A
brief history
[5] New Zealand has been a party to
the Refugee Convention since 1960 and to its Protocol since
1973.6 The initial RSD procedures, first
detailed in
inter-departmental circular letters of 6 September 1978 and 1 March
1981, were highly informal and severely criticised by the High Court in
the Benipal case.7
In
March 1991 the RSD procedures were reformed and given clearer structure
by Terms of Reference which created a two-tier RSD process comprising a
first instance hearing by an immigration officer with a right of appeal
to an appellate tribunal called the Refugee Status Appeals
Authority.8 These informal procedures were
finally translated
into statutory form by the Immigration Amendment Act 1999, s 40 which
inserted a new Part 6A into the now repealed Immigration Act
1987.9 The new provisions came into force on 1
October
1999. This reform apart, for a period of some twenty years from
1991 to 29 November 2010 the New Zealand RSD system was characterised
by its stability.
[6] However, as from 29 November
2010 the jurisdiction of the Refugee Status Appeals Authority to make
final refugee determinations has been transferred to the now
Immigration and Protection Tribunal with that tribunal having an
enlarged mandate to determine also protection claims under both CAT,
Article 3 and ICCPR, Articles 6 and 7.10 It is
intended, wherever
possible, to refer exclusively to the new legislation in the form of
the Immigration Act 2009. But while reference is made to the new
statutory provisions, of necessity it will be the jurisprudence and
practice of the now disestablished RSAA which will be described. At the
date of writing the new IPT had yet to hear and determine refugee and
protection claims in any number.11
Domestic
incorporation of CSR, CAT and ICCPR
[7] Following the pattern set by the
earlier 1987 legislation, the Immigration Act 2009 does not incorporate
into New Zealand domestic law all of the CSR, CAT or ICCPR. The
legislation domesticates only the key provisions relevant to expulsion
or return:
(a)
|
CSR |
-
-
|
the definition of
“refugee” in CSR, Article 1.12
the non-refoulement
obligation in CSR, Articles 32 and 33.13
|
(b) |
CAT |
-
-
|
the definition of
“torture” in CAT, Article 1.14
the non-refoulement
obligation in CAT, Article 3.15
|
(c) |
ICCPR |
- |
Articles
6 and 7. As neither Article expressly imposes an obligation of
non-refoulement it is stipulated by the 2009 Act that a person must be
recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR if
there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she will be in
danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CIDT) if deported from
New Zealand.16 |
A
two-tier determination system
[8] A two-tier process operates
comprising a first instance hearing by a refugee and protection officer
of the Refugee Status Branch, Department of Labour with a right of
appeal to an appellate tribunal which, as mentioned, is now called the
Immigration and Protection Tribunal (previously the Refugee Status
Appeals Authority).
[9] At first instance the refugee or
protection claimant (who is entitled to the assistance of a lawyer on
legal aid) is required to submit a claim form together with all
supporting evidence including a detailed written statement and relevant
COI.17 This is followed by an interview by a
refugee and
protection officer. After the interview the officer prepares an
“interview report” setting out the officer’s understanding of the
evidence given at the interview and the claimant is afforded an
opportunity to correct any misunderstandings, errors or omissions which
may have occurred. Any COI not sourced from the claimant is also
disclosed at this stage. Further evidence, including COI, can
then be submitted by the claimant in response. Thereafter the
officer prepares a detailed written decision setting out the reasons
either for recognising or not recognising the individual as a refugee
or protected person. In the event of a negative decision, the
claimant has a right of appeal to the Immigration and Protection
Tribunal.
[10] On appeal to the IPT all
questions of fact and law are at large and the appeal proceeds as a
hearing de novo. The IPT is under an obligation to come to its
own independent conclusion on all issues of fact and law, including
credibility and country information. To this end the claimant is
interviewed personally by the IPT with the claimant once more being
entitled to the assistance of a legally aided lawyer. The
claimant is expected to submit any relevant evidence, including COI and
the IPT itself is free to introduce its own evidence and COI, provided
that that evidence and COI is made available to the claimant for
comment and challenge.18
Responsibility
to establish claim
[11]
Both at first instance and on appeal a person seeking recognition as a
refugee or as a protected person is responsible for establishing his or
her claim for recognition and must ensure that all information,
evidence and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in
support of the claim are provided to the refugee and protection officer
or the IPT as the case may be.19 Both at first
instance and on
appeal the decision-maker may seek information from any source, but is
not obliged to seek any information, evidence or submissions further to
that provided by the claimant. Indeed the application can be
determined on the basis only of the information, evidence and
submissions provided by the claimant.20
[12] The rule that a claimant is
responsible for establishing the claim, is
not to be applied mechanically.21 While the
burden of proof in
principle rests on the claimant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all
the relevant facts is shared between the claimant and the
decision-maker.22 It has long been an
established feature of the
New Zealand refugee status determination process that the
non-adversarial nature of the proceedings means that the inquiry is
shared between the claimant and the decision-maker.23
[13]
It is an equally long established principle that the requirement of
evidence should not be too strictly applied in view of the difficulty
of proof inherent in the special situation in which a person seeking
recognition as a refugee or as a protected person finds him or
herself. In this regard the RSAA frequently applied the UNHCR
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status at
para [196]:24
It is a general legal
principle that the burden of
proof lies on the person submitting a claim. Often, however, an
applicant may not be able to support his statements by documentary or
other proof, and cases in which an applicant can provide evidence of
all his statements will be the exception rather than the rule. In
most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the
barest necessities and very frequently even without personal
documents. Thus, while the burden of proof in principle rests on
the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant
facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner. Indeed,
in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all the means at his
disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the
application. Even such independent research may not, however,
always be successful and there may also be statements that are not
susceptible of proof. In such cases, if the applicant’s account
appears credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to the
contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.
An
individualised assessment and the limitations to COI
[14]
It is axiomatic that CSR, Article 1 along with CAT, Article 3 and
ICCPR, Articles 6 and 7 require that the individual claiming
recognition as a refugee or as a protected person must establish an
individualised risk of being persecuted, tortured, arbitrarily deprived
of life or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. The focus is on the specific circumstances of the
individual, those circumstances necessarily being unique. This
imposes an inherent limitation on the extent to which COI can assist
the decision-maker in making an assessment of the risk faced by the
claimant. It is rare (though not entirely unknown) for COI to
address the circumstances of a particular individual. It is even
more rare for COI to meaningfully predict the specific risk of harm to
an individual in another country at some future point in time.
[15]
While the assessment of risk is from beginning to end an objective one
it is fallacious to assume that the risk must be established by
evidence external to the refugee or protection claimant. The
assessment may be based largely, or even primarily, on the claimant’s
own credible testimony.25
An
inquisitorial process
[16]
>From its inception, the refugee and protection process in New Zealand
has proceeded on inquisitorial lines, both at first instance and on
appeal.26 The quintessentially inquisitorial
nature of refugee
and
protection decision-making was explicitly recognised and approved by
the New Zealand Supreme Court in 2010.27 It is
now expressly
provided by the 2009 statute that the Immigration and Protection
Tribunal may conduct proceedings in an inquisitorial or an adversarial
manner or adopt a procedure which is both inquisitorial and adversarial
in nature.28
[17]
Hearings on refugee and protection claims have never been open to the
public. In addition, the New Zealand government is not usually
represented at appeal hearings. Only the claimant, his or her
lawyer an independent interpreter and the tribunal member(s) are
ordinarily present.29
[18]
When considering an appeal the IPT may seek information from any source
and may in fact require the chief executive of the Department of Labour
to seek and provide information relevant to an appeal.30
However,
the IPT is under a statutory duty to disclose to the claimant any
information or material that is provided to the Tribunal by a source
other than the claimant and which is or may be prejudicial to him or
her.31 The claimant must have opportunity to
rebut that
information
or to comment on it.
High emphasis on
credibility of claimant
[19]
While the New Zealand appellate tribunal has power to seek information,
this discretion is an inherently circumscribed one.32
First,
there
is the potential for breaching the confidentiality obligation owed to
the claimant in the course of an enquiry.33
Second, there is the
potential that the making of an enquiry can render the claimant a
refugee or protected person sur place.
That is, the enquiry may
place at risk a claimant who would otherwise have no proper claim to
refugee or protection status. Third, the making of enquiries
inevitably leads to delay. This is inherently undesirable in the
refugee and protection context. Fourth, there are practical
difficulties inherent in the enquiry process such as identifying and
accessing the holder of the information, language difficulties, the
reluctance of individuals to provide information to officials and the
inevitable limitations which impose themselves when making an enquiry
at a distance. For example, responses are often one dimensional
and on their own cannot be properly understood by the tribunal with the
result that the further questions which should be asked are not because
the agent on the ground is seldom aware of what is of real interest to
the tribunal. Fifth, the outcome of the enquiry may be
problematical if the fruits of the investigation are enigmatic or
ambiguous. Sixth, the veracity of information, documents and
their content is often incapable of effective verification.
Seventh, the making of enquiry inevitably involves expense and the New
Zealand tribunals have never been funded at a level which permits
investigations of a meaningful nature. Finally, there is also the
difficulty that COI will seldom address the specific circumstances of
the individual claimant. In the majority of cases COI is of a
much more general kind.
[20]
Largely because of these considerations the general approach of the
RSAA to refugee claims was to focus primarily on the credibility of the
refugee claimant as assessed against publicly accessible
information.34 This approach was approved by
the New Zealand
Supreme Court.35
[21]
Credibility cannot, however, be pursued as an end in itself. The
decision-maker cannot allow the pursuit of credibility issues to divert
him or her from those considerations which are primarily relevant to
the claim to refugee or protection status.36
Even if the
decision-maker concludes that nothing which the claimant has said is
true other evidence may establish that the person is a refugee or
protected person. So if, for example, the evidence of a young
male Tamil claimant is entirely rejected evidence external to the
claimant may nevertheless establish that simply being a young male
Tamil may be sufficient to put the person at risk of being persecuted,
tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or
punishment. In these circumstances it must inevitably follow that
the person is a refugee or protected person even though nothing of the
person’s account is accepted as true.37 As
pointed out by James C
Hathaway, the objective focus of the refugee definition [and, one could
add, of the relevant articles in CAT and the ICCPR] requires that even
clear evidence of a lack of candour does not necessarily negate a
claimant’s need for protection.38 Furthermore,
the fact that a
claimant has lied when giving evidence does not of itself mean that the
whole of his or her evidence is untruthful.39
The decision-maker
is
required to ask whether a person, having all of the characteristics of
the claimant, is at risk of being persecuted, tortured or subjected to
CIDT on return.40 By way of illustration of the
force of these
points it can be noted that among the leading cases of the RSAA are two
in which the refugees persisted in advancing untrue accounts.
When those accounts were abandoned and the true facts disclosed,
refugee recognition followed notwithstanding the admitted lies.41
Only
publicly
available information
[22]
>From the time the current two-tier decision-making process was put in
place in 1991, recognition has been given to the fundamental principle
that all COI to be taken into account by the decision-maker must be
disclosed to the claimant and an opportunity given to rebut, answer or
comment. This fundamental rule of fairness means, in effect, that
only publicly available COI can be used in the refugee and protection
context. It also means that adequate opportunity must be given
for COI and other disclosed material to be both read and considered.42
[23]
It has also been a requirement that COI be interpreted
reasonably. In one notable case the High Court held that the RSAA
had taken an unreasonable view of the COI on Iraq contained in Amnesty
International reports. In addition, it was held, the RSAA reading
of those reports was inconsistent with other material the RSAA had
before it. Further, the inferences drawn from the reports were
unreasonable. The RSAA’s interpretation of the two reports had
the effect of minimising the significance of and the risk to religious
leaders in Iraq. This difficulty was compounded by the RSAA’s
failure to address itself to the position of Shi’a religious leaders,
since that was who the claimant was, rather than Shi’a clerics
only. The RSAA’s interpretation of the Amnesty International
reports significantly coloured its finding that there was no risk to
the claimant at the level of a real chance.43
Classified
information
[24]
The Immigration Act 2009 has a codified regime for the receipt of
classified information in refugee and protection claims. While
there is a complex and not entirely informative definition of
“classified information” (too lengthy to repeat here), such information
can generally be said to relate to matters of security or criminal
conduct.44 It is expressly provided that
classified information
relating to security or criminal conduct may be relied on in
decision-making but the relevant agency which provides the classified
information must ensure that such information is balanced.45
That
is, the provider agency must ensure that:
(a)
The information is provided in a manner that does
not, by reason of the omission of any other relevant classified or
non-classified information, give a misleading view of the information
supplied; and
(b)
Any classified or non-classified information that
is favourable to the person subject to the decision or proceedings is
also provided; and
(c)
Any further classified information that becomes
available and that is relevant to the decision or proceedings is
provided.
[25]
Another notable safeguard is that while the classified information
itself may be withheld from the individual affected, there is a clear
and unambiguous duty on the decision-maker to provide a summary of the
allegations arising from the classified information and to provide that
summary to the person who is the subject of the proposed decision for
comment.46 The classified information may be
relied upon only to
the extent that the allegations arising from the information can be
summarised.47 So if the information cannot be
assembled in a
balanced way and a summary also disclosed to the claimant, it cannot be
used by the decision-maker.48
Confidentiality
maintained
[26]
As a general principle a claim to be recognised as a refugee or
protected person in New Zealand and the information provided in support
of that claim is required by the Immigration Act 2009 to be kept
confidential. Specifically, confidentiality as to the fact that a
person is a claimant, a refugee or a protected person, and as to the
particulars relating to the person’s claim or status, must at all times
during and subsequent to the determination of the claim be maintained
by all persons and, in a particular case, may require confidentiality
to be maintained as to the very fact or existence of a claim or case,
if disclosure of its fact or existence would tend to identify the
person concerned or be likely to endanger the safety of any
person.49 Breach of this obligation is a
criminal offence.50 The
only
exceptions permitted to the confidentiality obligation are those listed
in the Immigration Act 2009.51 These exceptions
recognise that
the
Act does not cloak refugee claims with absolute confidentiality
whatever the circumstances. Rather it strikes a balance between
competing interests and recognises that in certain circumstances the
state must, within highly circumscribed limits, be permitted to
disclose details of the refugee or protection claim to other government
agencies of New Zealand.
Challenging a
decision of the IPT
[27]
A claimant not recognised by the IPT as a refugee or protected person
may appeal to the High Court on a question of law but leave of that
court must be obtained.52 Judicial review
proceedings on
conventional common law administrative law grounds can also be
commenced.53 The High Court must endeavour to
hear such
proceedings
and any appeal together.54 Judicial review is
not a general
appeal. In very broad terms, judicial review is confined to
questions of law, errors in procedure and a failure to observe the
rules of fairness. Judicial review is concerned not with the
decision, but with the decision-making process.55
[28]
It follows that the IPT is the component of the New Zealand RSD process
which is intended to be the most effective venue for challenging
factual decisions made at first instance. Only the IPT possesses
jurisdiction to conduct a de novo investigation of the facts and to
receive any evidence relevant to the refugee or protection claim
irrespective whether that evidence was submitted at the first instance
hearing before a refugee and protection officer.
ACCESSING COI - THE RRIB56
[29]
In the period 1991 to 1996 (approx), in a largely pre-internet
environment, country information was accessed by tribunal members in an
informal and haphazard manner. The RSAA “library” consisted of
materials gathered by its members from their own researches together
with other COI submitted in evidence by refugee claimants. The
“collection” was held in a disorganised series of filing boxes.
[30]
The New Zealand Refugee Status Library was established in 1996 to serve
the information needs of the Refugee Status Branch of Immigration New
Zealand and of the RSAA.57 The main role of the
research librarians was
to provide background country and human rights information to assist
the assessment of claims to refugee recognition. They also
provided specific information in response to requests from
decision-makers in the RSD process. The library’s collections
have always been accessible to outside users, including refugee and
protection claimants and those assisting them, particularly lawyers.
[31]
Begun as a sole charge operation in 1996 and always based in Auckland,
the library grew to four staff by 2001 and now has 8.5 FTE (full time
equivalents) including a three-person team in Wellington. The
library is presently a separate branch within Immigration New Zealand,
Department of Labour and is currently known as the Refugee Research
& Information Branch (RRIB) with first instance decision-makers of
the Refugee Status Branch and the IPT as its major stakeholders.
In 2005 its mandate was extended with a team of three research
librarians in Wellington set up to serve the research and information
needs of the Immigration Profiling Group in Border Security.
Following the Department of Labour Corporate Model Implementation
Project, the RRIB reporting line was moved to the Information
Management Division of the Business Services Group in the Department of
Labour. The work the RRIB carries out and the relationships with
core stakeholders are unchanged, although the provision of COI for
residence appeal and deportation matters is increasing following the
establishment of the IPT in 2010. An additional Research
Librarian has been employed to meet this demand.
[32]
All research staff are experienced, professional librarians with
post-graduate qualifications. They are also required to adhere to
the LIANZA (Library & Information Association of Aotearoa NZ) Code
of Professional Conduct.
Advantages of a
specialised research unit
[33]
The advantages of a specialised research unit are possibly self-evident
but include:
(a)
Research is carried out by qualified information
specialists, trained in search methodology. They are able not
only to source and supply both general country and human rights
information and the answers to highly specific questions about events,
groups, people and places, but also to ensure such information is
stored in fully searchable databases.
(b)
Consistent information can be supplied to all
clients in the core user groups.
(c)
Researchers, as part of their work, continually
seek new reliable sources and are trained to evaluate the credibility,
credentials and impartiality of the source, allowing decision-makers
more time to devote to their own specialised field(s).
(d)
Duplication of effort is reduced and cost savings
result.
(e)
The same information can be made available to
refugee and protection claimants and their counsel as to the
decision-makers.
[34]
The librarians rely heavily on electronic sources of information and
make extensive use of online reports by the major human rights
monitoring bodies, international government and non-government
organisations and credible news and political reportage. Examples
of sources used include: UNHCR Refworld, Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, European Country of Origin
Information Network, U.S. Library of Congress, International War &
Peace Reporting, Minority Rights Group International, Jane’s
Intelligence and numerous national and thematic sites and
databases. A new secure Internet bookmarking system has been set
up on ‘Delicious’ for researchers to share useful sites. There were 629
bookmarks added in the first few months. In addition a
subscription to Nexis online news allows fully searchable access to a
large range of up-to-date and archived international news
sources. The library collection includes print copies of
reference tools on political parties, languages, ethnic groups,
religions, defence and security systems, refugee law and country
guidebooks. A small selection of current affairs and refugee
journals is also held. The library catalogue and index provides access
to 22,860 reference items found during the research process. All
research requests and responses are uploaded into a separate searchable
in-house database for future reference.
Language
barriers
[35]
As to language barriers, most general country and human rights
information is available in English from credible international
sources. Information about specific people or places is
occasionally only available in the language of the country
concerned. The RRIB has staff with fluency in French, German and
Italian and with some knowledge of several other languages. One
researcher is also a qualified translator. Immigration New
Zealand also has staff from diverse language backgrounds and
researchers may draw on this resource where necessary. In some
instances the information may be referred to departmentally accredited
translation providers to ensure the integrity of the translation
provided to decision-makers.
Cooperation
between COI researchers and decision-makers
[36]
The RRIB enjoys a sound professional and collegial relationship with
each of its core stakeholder groups. This in no way impinges on
the impartiality of any of the actors. A memorandum of
understanding between the Department of Labour and Ministry of Justice
will formalise the relationship of the new IPT (administered by the
Ministry) with the RRIB and the RSB and specify the services and
information the two branches are to supply to the IPT.
[37]
Senior members of the RSAA regularly provided training on refugee
jurisprudence to both RSB and RRIB staff. In addition researchers
often attend joint training sessions with refugee and protection
officers on topics such as refugee status determination procedures and
refugee and protection law. New immigration and protection
officers have training sessions on RRIB services and “how to write
research requests”. Similar sessions are offered to IPT
members. The RRIB also offers country information and thematic
presentations to both the RSB and the IPT.
[38]
The librarians are very aware that people’s lives are affected by the
information they provide and are scrupulous about seeking out the best
quality and most current information. They are equally scrupulous
about impartiality and careful to establish the credentials of a
source. They do not evaluate the evidence but pass it in “raw”
form (with appropriate disclaimers if necessary) to the decision-maker
whose task it is to decide what impact the information is to have on
the case in hand.
[39]
New Zealand is a member of the Inter-Governmental Consultations on
Migration, Asylum and Refugees. The RRIB regularly participates
in the COI section of the IGC website, where they are able to seek and
provide information from/to member States that they have not been able
to source elsewhere. Where possible the RRIB endeavours to
participate in at least one of the COI Working Groups usually held in
Geneva each year. This provides not only an updating on
international developments in the field, but enables the bench marking
of performance against international counterparts.58
[40]
COI in New Zealand has not yet come under the same scrutiny as is now
occurring within the EU context.59
APPROACH TO COI - TRIBUNAL LEVEL
Disclosure
[41]
As mentioned earlier, the consistent and unwavering approach taken by
the RSAA was that any COI uncovered by the tribunal’s own researches or
received from the RRIB was required to be disclosed to the claimant if
that information could potentially be used by the tribunal in deciding
the case.60
Consistent
interpretation of COI
[42]
To promote the consistent interpretation and application of COI the
RSAA would from time to time hold seminars for members for the purpose
of reviewing human rights developments in a particular country with a
focus on the evaluation of recent reports relevant to a specific
category of cases then being heard by the RSAA. This approach was
facilitated by the relatively small number of members of the RSAA and
that number declined in more recent years in parallel with the decline
in the number of refugee claims received. For example, in 1999
there were fifteen part time members. In 2000 there were two full
time and nineteen part time members. By 2005 there were six full
time and twenty-three part time members. However in 2007 the
numbers began to fall, there being six full time and fourteen part time
members and by 2010 there were four full time and seven part time
members.
[43]
Weekly informal meetings of members also provided a venue for
discussion of the sometimes fluid human rights situation in key source
countries and the significance of those developments to a particular
case or class of cases. But cases were always determined on the
basis of the evidence heard and disclosed within the context of the
particular case.
[44]
A peer review system also ensured that before any decision was
published the draft was vetted by a senior member of the tribunal not
with a view to influencing the outcome of the case (independence of
decision-makers was at all times respected) but to draw attention to
obvious errors and potentially inconsistent interpretation and
application of relevant COI.
[45]
While the RSAA most often sat as a single member panel, it would
appoint a panel of two, three and on occasion five members where:
- a
“new” country of origin was encountered in
respect of which the RSAA had little or no experience; or
- following
major changes in the human rights
situation in a country with which the RSAA had long experience, it was
necessary to hear and evaluate the new COI.
This allowed for
a more meaningful and objective assessment of COI, the
panel having opportunity to debate the different perspectives and
interpretations available on the evidence. By allowing more than
one perspective to be brought to the interpretation of the COI, a
hopefully more nuanced understanding of the COI was achieved.
[46]
The RSAA never adopted a formal system whereby a single panel purported
to arrive at a definitive interpretation or assessment of COI, whether
related to credibility, the risk of harm (or categories of persons at
risk of harm) and the Convention ground(s) (if any) relevant to the
risk of harm. Nor has the New Zealand legislation ever permitted
such an approach.61
[47]
This does not mean that detailed assessments of country conditions
cannot be found in RSAA jurisprudence and there are indeed decisions,
particularly in the period 1992 to 1999, which do have the appearance
of what is now referred to in the United Kingdom as country guidance
cases. Those cases related to:
- Republic
of India - Punjab.
- China
- One-child policy.
- Indonesia
- Ethnic Chinese.
[48]
The Punjab. One of the first major jurisprudential and COI issues
facing the RSAA was whether claimants at risk of being persecuted by
militants in the Punjab could be denied recognition as refugees on the
basis that they could access meaningful state protection outside the
Punjab but within the Republic of India. If the legal answer to
that question was “yes”, the next question, turning on COI, related to
the circumstances and conditions in which this alternative form of
protection could indeed be accessed. As to the jurisprudential
issue, the RSAA held that provided a number of strict pre-conditions
are met, refugee status recognition can be withheld where an internal
protection alternative can be demonstrated.62
As to COI, the
decision in Refugee Appeal No. 18/92
Re JS (5 August 1992) attempted a
summary of the determinations made by the RSAA in its first twelve
months of operation. In particular it identified the factors
which had been taken into account in assessing the internal protection
alternative in the context of non-state agents of persecution. It
expressed the hope that the summary would make it possible for an
intending claimant to make a realistic assessment of the likely outcome
of an appeal. The Authority did, however, caution that the COI
assessment made at that time was, at best, provisional:
We emphasise that the
foregoing represents a general
summary only of the jurisprudence to date. If conditions in India
or the Punjab change, or new evidence bearing on the issues comes to
hand, we will, of course, always be prepared to re-evaluate the
situation. Furthermore, no case is ever identical on its
facts. We recognize that as conditions in a country of origin
change, so too must the assessment of the particular case on appeal.
[emphasis in original]
This caution
notwithstanding, the High Court subsequently drew
attention to the danger of country guidance cases reversing the onus of
proof:63
... the decision in Refugee Appeal No. 18/92 Re JS
is so emphatic on the issue of relocation that an onus is effectively
placed upon subsequent appellants to bring fresh evidence or fail on
that point.
[49]
Two and a half years later, in Refugee
Appeal No. 523/92 Re RS (17
March 1995) a four member panel of senior members of the RSAA, after an
extended review of COI, concluded that most of the militant groups in
the Punjab had been crushed by mid-1993. That assessment led, in
turn, to the conclusion that individuals claiming a risk of harm at the
hand of militants could either not establish a well-founded fear of
being persecuted or could mostly find an internal protection
alternative either within the Punjab or elsewhere in India.
[50]
As to China and the one-child family cases, the RSAA in its early years
heard a number of refugee claims by Chinese nationals whose risk of
harm on return to China was said to arise from opposition to the
one-child family policy. That policy was the subject of extensive
investigation and review in Refugee
Appeal No. 3/91 Re ZWD (20 October
1992). Rather than attempting to identify the categories of
individuals at risk of harm and the circumstances in which that risk
would eventuate, the decision largely confines itself to documenting
the origin and working of the one-child policy and whether the means
chosen for its implementation were in violation of international human
rights law.
[51]
As to the Indonesian Chinese cases. The decision in Refugee
Appeal No. 71404/99 (29 October 1999) arose out of the
significant
number of refugee claims by Indonesian nationals of Chinese ethnicity
following the outbreak of serious anti-Chinese violence in May
1998. The decision examined the history of anti-Chinese violence
in Indonesia and the causes of the May 1998 riots. Drawing on
that background, it made an assessment of the future risk of harm faced
generally by Chinese in Indonesia. The decision also addresses
whether an atmosphere of insecurity can be described as “being
persecuted” in terms of the CSR and finally, it also addresses the
internal protection alternative in the context of an archipelago nation.
[52]
No doubt other examples can be found. The foregoing list is
simply illustrative.
[53]
But the general approach in New Zealand has been to avoid decisions of
this kind as the prevailing and dominant view has been that few refugee
or protection cases are ever identical on their facts and that country
conditions are far too complex and subtle to permit a single
interpretation in which inevitable variations and nuances are
artificially collapsed into a single conclusion or finding. See
for example the following statement taken from Refugee Appeal No.
2507/95 Re JEAH (22 April 1996) in which the Peruvian claimant
asserted
a risk of being persecuted by the Sendero Luminoso. His claim
ultimately failed on the grounds (inter alia) that no imputed political
opinion could be established as flowing from the claimant’s refusal to
comply with a demand that he pay a “tax” to the Sendero Luminoso.
The claimant had relied on several decisions of the RSAA in which, on
their particular facts, an imputed political opinion had been
established by other claimants in not dissimilar circumstances.
In relation to these other cases the RSAA remarked:
It must be understood
that every refugee case is
unique. Much turns on the issue of credibility.
Furthermore, because the focus of the inquiry is not so much on what
has happened in the past as on what might occur in the future, each
case has its own subtle nuances which are determined very much by the
inter-relationship between credibility, the facts of the case, what is
understood of the country conditions in the country of origin and,
finally, by the forward looking assessment of the risk faced by the
specific claimant. In entering into this difficult field of
inquiry (ie, as to whether a particular set of facts establishes a
well-founded fear of [being persecuted], different panels of the
Authority will be influenced by a range of factors, not all of them
necessarily duplicated in superficially similar cases involving the
same country of origin.
...
We
therefore stress that the task of any
decision-maker is to assess whether, on the particular facts found to
have been established, it could be said that the appellant has
established to the requisite degree that the persecution feared by him
or her is for reason of the appellant’s political opinion.
[54]
Similar comments are to be found in the High Court of Australia where
in Appellant S395/2002 v Minister
for Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs McHugh and Kirby JJ said:64
It is a mistake to
assume that because members of a
group are or are not persecuted, and the applicant is a member of that
group, the applicant will or will not be persecuted. The central
question is always whether this
individual applicant has a
“well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of ... membership of
a particular social group”. [emphasis in original]
[55]
In the same case Gummow and Hayne JJ criticised attempts to classify
large numbers of cases:
[75] Again, because
the question requires
prediction, a decision-maker will often find it useful to consider how
persons like the applicant have been, or are being, treated in the
applicant's country of nationality. That is useful because it may
assist in predicting what may happen if the applicant returns to the
country of nationality. But, as with any reasoning of that kind, the
critical question is how similar are the cases that are being compared.
[76]
Because reasoning of the kinds just described
is often employed, it is perhaps inevitable that those, like the
Tribunal, who must deal with large numbers of decisions about who is a
refugee, will attempt to classify cases. There are dangers in
creating and applying a scheme for classifying claims to protection.
Those dangers are greatest if the classes are few and rigidly defined.
But whatever scheme is devised, classification carries the risk that
the individual and distinctive features of a claim are put aside in
favour of other, more general features which define the chosen class.
[77]
Further, there is a serious risk of inverting
the proper order of inquiry by arguing from an a priori classification
given to the applicant, or the applicant's claim, to a conclusion about
what may happen to the applicant if he or she returns to the country of
nationality, without giving proper attention to the accuracy or
applicability of the class chosen. That is, there is a real risk of
assuming (wrongly) that a particular applicant will be treated in the
same way as others of that race, religion, social class or political
view are treated in that country. It would, for example, be wrong to
argue from a premise like "homosexuality is generally ignored in
Bangladesh" to a conclusion that "this applicant (a homosexual) will
not be persecuted on account of his sexuality", without paying close
attention to the effect of the qualification of the premise provided by
the word "generally". Thus it would be necessary in the example given
to consider whether, on return to Bangladesh, the applicant would stand
apart from other homosexuals in that country for any
reason.
[56]
In the specific UK context it has been observed that:65
Country guidance
cases were found to be helpful for
providing context; limiting the scope of argument; narrowing down
issues; defining risk categories; assessing the merits of a case;
settling contradictory COI; and providing a wealth of expert and COI
evidence. However, their limitations were also noted: they go out
of date; country situations are dynamic; ultimately they are case
specific with general conclusions drawn out; the Home Office can
concede at any given moment; the categories defined are often very
narrow; there are divergent outcomes owing to the variance in the
judiciary; and countries and issues tend to be selected almost randomly
and in a non-transparent manner.
[57]
The subjective and highly contestable nature of COI assessment is
perhaps illustrated by the controversial decision of the UK Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal in HGMO
(Relocation to Khartoum) Sudan CG [2006]
UK IAT 00062 in which it handed down a country guidance decision on
what has been described as “the highly controversial question whether
it was unduly harsh to expect anyone, and if so whom, to relocate from
an area of Sudan to which they could not return to the displaced
persons’ camps around Khartoum where conditions were, on any view,
deplorable”.66 The determination was that with
discernable
exceptions, it was not unduly harsh. When the HGMO (Relocation to
Khartoum) decision was examined in the House of Lords, Baroness
Hale
expressed concern at its approach:67
28. Yet the
Tribunal concluded that because
the conditions faced by returning Darfuris, however appalling, would be
no worse than those faced by other Sudanese IDPs it would not be not
“unduly harsh” to expect them to return. The standard of comparison
was, not with their lives in Darfur before their persecution, not with
the general run of ordinary lives in Sudan, not even with the lives of
poor people in Sudan, but with the lives of the poorest of the poor,
internally displaced victims of the civil war in the south, living in
camps or squatter slums, and “subject from time to time to relocations,
sometimes involving force and human rights violations” (para 244). They
too had been subsistence farmers, ill-equipped to survive in the city
slums (para 239); they too had suffered the psychological horrors of
civil war (para 238), if not of government-backed genocide; the
Darfuris would be no worse off, unless particular individuals attracted
the adverse interest of the authorities (para 242). With respect, this
is not the individualised, holistic assessment which the question
requires.
[58]
In the later but related KH (Sudan)
Sedley LJ noted the submission that
the AIT had made stereotypical assumptions about the impact of poverty
and the traumas of war on Darfurians, that health conditions in the
camps were appalling and that the decision flew in the face of expert
evidence.68 He observed that it was a
submission with which the
Court of Appeal might, if it were a primary decision-maker, have had
“considerable sympathy” but they were not grounds of appeal and
therefore were not issues which could be addressed.69
Rather, the
appeals were to be approached on the footing that internal relocation
to a place of sufficient safety would be reasonable unless it was
unduly harsh for the individual concerned. He then noted at [8]
what is, in effect, the “reverse burden of proof” phenomenon implicit
in country guidance cases:
... that immigration
judges are expected to follow
the country guidance contained in HGMO
unless acceptable evidence is
placed before them by either party which shows it to have been
incorrect or to be no longer correct in some significant respects.
[59]
In the result, while in the Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords
real concern was expressed as to the “country guidance”, the restricted
nature of appellate proceedings precluded effective intervention to
correct doubtful findings of fact. Nevertheless it can be noted
that in KH (Sudan) there were
in fact five appellants. One of
them, (QA (Sudan)) did succeed
in the Court of Appeal as he was able to
meet the reverse burden of proof. In the following passage Moses
LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, identified the error as being
one in which the decision-maker had failed to concentrate on the
specific circumstances of the individual refugee claimant:
36. The AIT in HGMO, as endorsed by the House of
Lords, has concluded that conditions in a camp or squatter area are not
such as to lead to the conclusion that it would be unduly harsh to
expect a young male adult to live there. Such a proposition is general
and in each case it is incumbent upon the fact finder to consider the
impact of such conditions on the particular appellant who contends it
would be unduly harsh to return there in the context of his or her
particular circumstances. Those circumstances, in the instant appeal,
are stark. The appellant has lost all his living relatives, killed by
those responsible for conditions in those camps. Not only has he lost
his siblings and his parents but also the one surviving relative who
enabled him to escape from his village. Nowhere is there any reference
within the determination of the AIT to the impact of those
circumstances. On the contrary, they are dismissed in a cursory manner
in the reference of the Tribunal to this appellant as being a “young
apparently healthy adult”. No regard has been had to the vital
consideration of the effect on this lone young man, even now only 20,
who will, if the Tribunal’s decision stands, have to face the prospect
of survival in a camp. Conditions in such camps were described by Dr
Khalil as being a “desperate situation” within “appalling conditions of
extreme poverty” (see § 43 of AH in the Court of Appeal). The
impact of such conditions will be accompanied by the everyday knowledge
that those responsible for such conditions are also responsible for the
death of his every living relative.
37. In our judgement
the failure to make any
reference to the particular circumstances of this appellant was an
error of law. Anyone reading of such circumstances might have little
difficulty in concluding that it would be unduly harsh to require this
appellant to return to a camp. But in HGMO the AIT made no reference to
the impact on those who had seen their parents and relatives killed by
the Janjaweed under the sponsorship of the Government of Sudan.
[60]
Reference can also be made to the decision of the Court of Appeal in FB
(Democratic Republic of Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department70 where the AIT, expressing
reservations, had relied
on a two
year old country guidance case. The decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeal, that court observing that country guidance cases
are “not to be construed like statutes”; guidance cases cannot cover
every possibility and the focus of the decision-maker must be on the
risk involved if the claimant were to be returned to the country of
origin.71 The Court emphasised that, as in
every other asylum
case,
the evidence must be looked at as a whole. That being so, one
might ask whether anything meaningful is achieved by the time and
resources invested in country guidance cases.72
Particularly
given
that the CSR, CAT and ICCPR mandate an individuated inquiry into the
particular and unique circumstances of the claimant.
Country
guidance
cases - some conclusions
[61]
There must be a real question whether “country guidance” is a
realistically achievable aim, premised as it is on the assumption that
a person or panel of persons will capture (accurately) the rich texture
of possibilities in a particular country and context, a country in
which the decision-makers do not live and most often have not visited
and when the assessment is based largely on what has been observed and
written by others in a language in which the decision-makers are not
fluent. The idea that someone can say, authoritatively, “what
really happens” in a given country is a bridge too far for some.
If a life has been lived entirely unobserved, if events, circumstances
and conditions have either not been noticed or not written about, that
life and those events remain invisible and are usually assumed not to
exist. It is one thing to make findings in relation to the narrow
circumstances of the individual refugee or protection claim where the
evidence is focussed on one person. It is an entirely different
matter to make generalisations about a country, its power structures,
the possibilities of life within that country and the circumstances in
which harm might befall individuals generally. Experience shows
that the truth on the ground is inevitably more subtle, more nuanced,
confused, complicated and contradictory. It is incapable of being
“shoe-horned” into neat categories or sets of conclusions. The
more so when specific conditions are not generally reported or are
incapable of investigation.
[62]
Then there is the point that country information is seldom
neutral. It always requires interpretation. When a refugee
decision-maker makes broad generalisations for a range of cases there
is too much room for the intrusion of the subjectivities of that
decision-maker (and indeed of the authors of the COI).73
There is
also much room for error.74 In addition a
gender-blind
interpretation of country information has for too long been a barrier
to the recognition of gender-based refugee and protection
claims.75
So too in the case of claims based on sexual orientation. Both
categories face a wall of silence.76 Little or
nothing might be
found in COI on persecution and discrimination based on gender, sexual
orientation, disability and age. The challenge of “decoding”
country information and identifying what is not there is insufficiently
remarked upon.
[63]
Beyond these points lies the unpleasant truth that country guidance
cases can and do deflect the decision-maker from the proper
inquiry. While it has been said that:77
... no country
guidance case is for ever; it is a
factual precedent ... and as such is open to revision in the light of
new facts - new either in the sense of being newly ascertained or in
the sense that they have arisen only since the decision was promulgated
- provided in each case that they are facts of sufficient weight.
the question the
downstream decision-maker is required to address
changes significantly. It ceases to be the one posed by the
treaties. It is not whether the refugee claimant has an
individuated well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention
reason or whether a specific protection claimant is at risk of torture,
CIDT or being arbitrarily deprived of life. Rather the question
becomes whether the claimant falls within a particular risk category
identified in the country guidance case and if not, whether he or she
can show “new facts” in the sense explained in KH (Sudan).78
[64]
On one view, the deflection of the refugee or protection inquiry away
from the individualised and particular circumstances of the specific
claimant threatens the integrity of the refugee or protection
enquiry. It could be said that attempting consistency through
country guidance cases comes at too high a price.
[65]
The RSAA generally avoided (with some exceptions) publishing “country
guidance” cases. It does not follow that its procedures were for
this reason wanting. A recent and extensive analysis of the UK
country guidance system concluded that it cannot be implied “that
country guidance is or should be a necessary feature of any asylum
process”.79 As earlier explained, it was in
this context that the
RSAA deployed other measures designed to achieve consistent
interpretation of COI such as seminars and training, informal meetings,
a peer review system and convening multi-member panels. Nor does
it follow that detailed assessments of COI were not made by the
RSAA. To the contrary. This can be seen from the RSAA
website which allows a search to be conducted, country by country,
according to the level of country information.80
The options
permitted are “any”, “high”, “medium” or “low”.
[66]
A search of this website using the search terms “Refugee Status Appeals
Authority” and “content high” produced the results set out in the table
which follows.81
Financial
Year
|
Number of decisions
decided by the RSAA |
Decisions
with high COI Content |
Countries |
2010
|
186
|
7
|
Iran, China, DRC,
South
Africa, Fiji, Sri Lanka x 2 |
2009
|
142
|
11
|
Kenya, Sri Lanka x 3,
Burma, Czech Republic, Turkey, Egypt, Iran,
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia |
2008
|
200
|
13
|
Algeria, India x 2,
China, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Iran, Syria,
Afghanistan, Turkey x 2, Burma |
2007
|
226
|
15
|
Sudan, Nepal,
Slovakia, China x 2, Pakistan, Iran, Sri Lanka x 2,
Israel, DRC, Zimbabwe, Hungary, Somalia |
[67]
In 2010 the “high” level of country information cases were:
- Refugee Appeal No. 76253 (31 March
2010) Iran.
- Refugee Appeal No. 76434 (15 April
2010)
China.
- Refugee Appeal No. 76342 (23 April
2010) DRC.
- Refugee Appeal No. 76398 (30 April
2010) South
Africa.
- Refugee Appeal No. 76512 (22 June
2010) Fiji.
- Refugee Appeal No. 76502 (29 June
2010) Sri Lanka.
- Refugee Appeal No. 76534 (4 August
2010) Sri Lanka.
A review of each
of these cases will show that a wide range of sources
of country information are routinely drawn on in New Zealand and there
is no attempt to arrive at exhaustive conclusions or assessments of
countries. The country information and fact findings are tailored
to the specific circumstances of the particular refugee or protection
claim.
Country guidance
to be distinguished from precedent setting decisions on the law
[68]
While the RSAA generally avoided publishing country guidance cases, it
took the opposite approach in publishing decisions which established
legal precedents. The view taken was that as a final and
specialist appellate tribunal it had a responsibility, applying Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, to ascertain
the “true autonomous and international” meaning of the Refugee
Convention spoken of by Lord Steyn in the House of Lords.82
The
purpose of RSAA precedent decisions on refugee law was to give guidance
and instruction to first instance decision-makers and to assist the
High Court on judicial review should the relevant legal issue come
before that court for determination. Some decisions have been
cited favourably in the House of Lords and UK Supreme Court.83
THE
LIMITATIONS OF COUNTRY INFORMATION - COI AND CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT
[69]
Country information is potentially relevant to (inter alia) the nature
of the harm faced in the country of origin, the risk of that harm
eventuating in the future, nexus and credibility. As to the last
of these issues, credibility assessment is a substantive subject on its
own. In a paper focussed on COI only a few observations can
be made on the relationship between COI and credibility.
[70]
The primary task of the decision-maker is fact-finding. The
ultimate issue is not credibility, but of the risk of serious
harm. That having been said, COI is nonetheless often properly
deployed to test and assess the credibility of the claimant. In
some case the question posed is whether the claimant’s account is
consistent with COI - and therefore more likely to be credible or
whether the account is inconsistent with COI - and therefore more
likely to be not credible.84 While there are
cases where COI can
properly assist in determining the credibility of the claimant in this
way, the deployment of COI in the credibility assessment exercise opens
up the broader and more fundamental question of how credibility can be
properly assessed. Further, if COI is to be used to assess the
credibility of the claimant, is it not necessary to also assess the
credibility of the COI itself? The proposition is that to
interrogate the credibility of the claimant by deploying COI
necessarily requires the interrogation of the credibility of that COI.
A
few
observations about credibility assessment
[71]
Beyond these observations lie the fundamental challenges of credibility
assessment itself.85 Without an appreciation of
the nature of
those
challenges there is a danger of COI being deployed in an impermissible
manner. Context is everything.
[72]
All refugee and protection claims require a narrative of the claimant’s
personal circumstances and although past harm is not a requirement of
the CSR, CAT, Article 3 and ICCPR, Articles 6 and 7, it is common to
find that past harm or past encounters with the agent of persecution
are central to the claimant’s narrative. The credibility of this
narrative is then subjected to close examination from different
perspectives including coherency, internal consistency, plausibility
and consistency of telling. Obviously there are also other
factors which potentially affect the credibility assessment. But
the last factor (consistency of telling) is particularly relevant to
appellate tribunals which conduct the refugee or protection enquiry on
a de novo basis. Changes or differences which occur in the
narrative on appeal compared with the evidence given in the initial
statement or at first instance (for example in relation to dates,
places, details of events) will often count against the claimant.
These assessments can be unforgiving and driven by false assumptions as
to how events are remembered and then recalled. Time and space
permit only two analyses to be referred to. The first is by
Daniel L Schacter who observes:86
... we tend to think
of memories as snapshots from
family albums that, if stored properly, could be retrieved in precisely
the same condition in which they were put away. But we now know
that we do not record our experiences the way a camera records
them. Our memories work differently. We extract key
elements from our experiences and store them. We then recreate or
reconstruct our experiences rather than retrieve copies of them.
Sometimes, in the process of reconstructing we add on feelings,
beliefs, or even knowledge we obtained after the experience. In
other words, we bias our memories of the past by attributing to them
emotions or knowledge we acquired after the event.
[73]
The second primary source drawn on for this paper is a recent journal
article which addresses the subject of memory in the context of refugee
and protection claims. It is impossible in a few lines to do
justice to this exemplary piece by Hilary Evans Cameron. It is
therefore intended to reproduce only the Abstract:87
Refugee status
decision makers typically have
unreasonable expectations of what and how people remember. Many
assume that our minds record all aspects of the events that we
experience, and that these memories are stored in our brains and remain
unchanged over time. Decades of psychological research has
demonstrated, however, that our memories are neither so complete nor so
stable, even setting aside the effects on memory of trauma and
stress. Whole categories of information are difficult to recall
accurately, if at all: temporal information, such as dates, frequency,
duration and sequence; the appearance of common objects; discrete
instances of repeated events; peripheral information; proper names; and
the verbatim wording of verbal exchanges. In addition, our
autobiographical memories change over time, and may change
significantly. As a result, while gaps or inconsistencies in a
claimant’s testimony may in some cases properly lead to a negative
credibility finding, such aspects are often misleading and should never
be used mechanically, and the bar must be set much lower. Many
decision makers must fundamentally readjust their thinking about
claimants’ memories if they are to avoid making findings that are as
unsound as they are unjust.
[74]
It is clear that a decision-maker cannot engage in the simplistic
exercise of comparing the claimant’s account with whatever COI the
decision-maker happens to have available and then proceeding to a
determination of “the truth” by treating the COI as the
touchstone. Credibility assessment cannot be reduced to such a
formulaic exercise. Nor can credibility assessment be assumed to
be an exercise undertaken with scientific precision.
Decision-makers need to be aware that “[A] possible life-and-death
decision extracted from shreds of evidence and subjective impressions
... has to be made”.88
A
few
observations about assessing the credibility of COI
[75]
Country information is inherently contestable. Some of the
reasons are set out earlier in the context of the discussion of country
guidance cases. Additional forceful and compelling reasons are
identified by Natasha Tsangarides in her recent study.89
[76]
The key problem is that people take as facts not what is, but what they
perceive to be facts:90
For the real
environment is altogether too big, too
complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not
equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many
permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in
that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before
we can manage with it. To traverse the world men must have maps
of the world. Their persistent difficulty is to secure maps on
which their own need, or someone else’s need, has not sketched in the
coast of Bohemia.
[77]
There is no denying the seductive nature of COI. It can lead the
decision-maker to believe that he or she “knows” about the claimant’s
country of origin, knows “the truth” of what happens in that country
(and what does not happen). There is a danger that the
decision-maker will reconstruct the claimant’s world on a simpler model
in order to manage it.91 To traverse the
claimant’s world the
decision-maker must have a map of that world. The persistent
difficulty is “to secure maps on which [the decision-maker’s] own need,
or someone else’s need, has not sketched in the coast of
Bohemia”.
[78]
The New Zealand refugee and protection determination system illustrates
a familiar pattern of progression from the disorganised and haphazard
collection and deployment of COI to the research, assembly and
presentation of COI by professional librarians qualified as information
specialists and trained in search methodology. While the RRIB
works very much in the background, the assistance provided by its
librarians to decision-makers as well as to refugee and protection
claimants underpins the entire determination process and is a necessary
component of the credibility of that process. The essential role
played by research librarians is insufficiently acknowledged.
[79]
A two-tier inquisitorial system in which the appellate tribunal
conducts a de novo hearing with all questions of fact (including COI)
and law being at large properly recognises the importance of ensuring
that the refugee or protection claimant has full opportunity to present
his or her case at both levels and to ensure that the decision is based
on accurate and current COI. But focussed as it is on the special
circumstances of the particular claimant, the refugee or protection
enquiry functions best when it avoids overreach. That is the
making of findings beyond those required by the context of the
particular case and intended to provide guidance to decision-makers in
later but similar cases.
[80]
There are inherent dangers in deploying COI in credibility
assessment. This does not mean to say that such deployment should
not occur. But there must be recognition that the decision-maker
may have false expectations as to how and what people remember and how
those memories are retrieved and narrated. Where there are such
false expectations the deployment of COI will not be of meaningful
assistance to the decision-maker. Additionally, there must be
recognition that COI is inherently contestable. The overarching
danger is that the decision-maker will reconstruct the claimant’s world
on a simpler model in order to manage it.
Table
1: The
number of refugee status applications submitted to the Refugee Status
Branch in the financial years from 1990/91 to 2009/2010.
Financial
Year |
Applications
received by RSB
|
1990/91 |
901
|
1991/92 |
1124
|
1992/93 |
541
|
1993/94 |
382
|
1994/95 |
641
|
1995/96 |
1064
|
1996/97 |
1534
|
1997/98 |
1784
|
1998/99 |
2019
|
1999/2000 |
1409
|
2000/01 |
1703
|
2001/02 |
1441
|
2002/03
|
955
|
2003/04
|
713
|
2004/05
|
399
|
2005/06
|
317
|
2006/07
|
244
|
2007/08
|
267
|
2008/09
|
246
|
2009/10
|
384
|
Table
2:
Approval/decline rates 2006 - 2010 - First Instance
Financial Year
(RSB) |
Number of Claims |
Percentage
Recognised |
Percentage
Declined |
2010
|
382
|
27.2%
|
72.8%
|
2009
|
246
|
29.8%
|
70.2%
|
2008
|
267
|
29.2%
|
70.8%
|
2007
|
244
|
23.7%
|
76.3%
|
2006
|
317
|
20%*
|
80%*
|
* figures from
RefNZ website
Table
3:
Approval/decline rates 2006 - 2010 - Appeal
Financial
Year |
Claims Received |
Number of
Decisions |
Percentage
Recognised |
Percentage
Declined |
2010
|
178
|
186
|
31%
|
69%
|
2009
|
121
|
142
|
40%
|
60%
|
2008
|
177
|
200
|
26.1%
|
73.9%
|
2007
|
171
|
226
|
27.9%
|
72.1%
|
2006
|
245
|
395
|
21.1%
|
78.9%
|
NOTE: These
statistics have been taken from:
•
Immigration New Zealand Refugee Analysis Monthly Report - June 2010
•
Annual reports of the Refugee Status Appeals Authority submitted to the
Minister of Immigration. These annual reports can be accessed at
<www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz>
<www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz> and at <www.refugee.org.nz>.
•
The Statistics page of the New Zealand Refugee Law website
<www.refugee.org.nz>.
Endnotes
1. The author of this paper was
one of three original appointees to the Refugee Status Appeals
Authority when it was first constituted in 1991 and remained a member
until the Authority was disestablished from 29 November 2010. In
the period 1994 to 2010 he was Deputy Chair and author of many of the
Authority’s principal decisions. Since 1993 he has held the
position of Adjunct Lecturer in Law at the Faculty of Law, University
of Auckland where he teaches Immigration and Refugee Law. He is
currently in full time practice in Auckland as a barrister.
2. See the
Immigration Act 2009,
Parts 5 and 7. All New Zealand legislation is accessible online
at <www.legislation.govt.nz>. Nearly all of the provisions
of the Act came into force at 2am on 29 November 2010. See the
Immigration Act 2009 Commencement Order 2010 (SR2010/185).
3. Compare and
contrast developments
primarily within the European Union: ACCORD Researching Country of Origin Information:
A Training Manual (2004 - updated April 2006)
<www.coi-training.net>; Common
EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI) (April
2008) <www.unhcr.org/refworld>; Gábor Gyulai Country Information in Asylum Procedures -
Quality as a Legal Requirement in the EU (2007, Hungarian
Helsinki Committee); IARLJ Judicial
Criteria for Assessing Country of Origin Information (COI): A Checklist
(November 2006) <www.iarlj.org/conferences/mexico>; UNHCR Country of Origin Information: Towards
Enhanced Cooperation (2004) <www.unhcr.org/refworld>.
4. But see Jeanne
Donald “Access to
Information for Immigration and Refugee Law Practitioners” (2002)
Auckland District Law Society Seminar
<www.refugee.org.nz/Reference> where it is recorded at [1.5] that
at the time of writing the Refugee Status Branch (the first instance
decision-maker) “refuses to provide practitioners with a copy of
country information relied on and cited in their interview reports ...
because the information is ‘publicly available’ (refer section 18 of
the Official Information Act)”. Ms Donald observes that this can
lead to difficulty in certain circumstances, particularly when a
practitioner is acting for detained claimants and must respond to
interview reports within a short timeframe and where citations refer to
an internet site that no longer exists.
5. See particularly
Natasha
Tsangarides The Refugee Roulette:
The Role of Country Information in Refugee Status Determination
(2010, Immigration Advisory Service) <www.iasuk.org> and Robert
Thomas Administrative Justice and
Asylum Appeals: A Study of Tribunal Adjudication (2011, Hart) at
Chapters 6 and 7.
6. See generally
Rodger Haines Laws of New Zealand,
Immigration
para [2].
7. Benipal
v Minister of Foreign Affairs (High Court Auckland, A878/83,
A993/83 and A1016/83, 29 November 1985, Chilwell J). An appeal by
the Crown was dismissed in Minister
of Foreign Affairs v Benipal [1988] 2 NZLR 222 (CA). See
also Rodger Haines Laws of New
Zealand, Immigration para [2].
8. Rodger Haines Laws of New Zealand, Immigration
para [194].
9. This followed
judicial criticism
of the informal nature of the Terms of Reference. See further
Rodger Haines “International Law and Refugees in New Zealand” [1999] NZ
Law Review 119.
10. For an overview
of the changes
effected by the Immigration Act 2009 see Rodger Haines “Sovereignty
Under Challenge - The New Protection Regime in the Immigration Bill
2007" [2009] NZ Law Review 149.
11. All decisions
of the Refugee
Status Appeals Authority from 1997 are to be found on the official
website at <www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz>. The leading
decisions of the RSAA are collected at the New Zealand Refugee Law
website <www.refugee.org.nz>. Some have been reported in
the New Zealand Administrative
Reports published by LexisNexis. The decisions of the IPT
are currently found at <www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/ipt>.
12. See Immigration
Act 2009, s 129.
13. See Immigration
Act 2009, s 164.
14. See Immigration
Act 2009, s
130(5).
15. See
Immigration Act 2009, ss
130(4) and 164.
16. See Immigration
Act 2009, ss 131
and 164. It is clear that the formula “substantial grounds for
believing that he or she will be in danger of being subjected to ...”
has been taken from CAT, Article 3(1).
17. See Immigration
Act 2009, s 133.
18. These essential
characteristics
have been drawn from the RSAA model.
19. See Immigration
Act 2009, ss 135
and 226.
20. Immigration Act
2009, ss136 and
228.
21. Butler v Attorney-General [1999]
NZAR 205 (CA).
22. UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status at 196; Mohammed v Refugee Status Appeals Authority
(High Court Auckland, M500/95, 21 December 1995, Tompkins J) at 2-3 and
C v Refugee Status Appeals Authority
(High Court Auckland, M1365-SW00, 4 May 2001, Nicholson J) at [60] and
[61].
23. Refugee Appeal No. 523/92 Re RS (17
March 1995) (NZRSAA) <www.refugee.org.nz>. A
comprehensive review of the case law is to be found in Refugee Appeal
No. 72668/01 [2002] NZAR 649 (NZRSAA).
24. For an early
example see Refugee Appeal No.
265/92 Re SA (29
June 1994) (NZRSAA) <www.refugee.org.nz>.
25. James Hathaway
and William Hicks
“Is There a Subjective Element in the Refugee Convention’s Requirement
of ‘Well-Founded Fear’?” (2005) 26 Mich. J. Int’l L 505 and The Michigan Guidelines on Well-Founded
Fear (2005) 26 Mich. J. Int’l L 491 at para [9]. Those
Guidelines properly reflect the principles applied in New
Zealand. See Refugee Appeal
No. 75692 [2007] NZAR 307 (NZRSAA).
26. For the
position prior to 29
November 2010 see Refugee Appeal No.
70656/97 (10 September 1997) (NZRSAA) and Refugee Appeal No. 72668/01 [2002]
NZAR 649 (NZRSAA) <www.refugee.org.nz>.
27. Attorney-General v Tamil X [2010]
NZSC 107 (NZSC) at [34] - [45].
28. See Immigration
Act 2009, s 218.
29. See Practice Note 2/2010 (Refugee and
Protection) (29 November 2010) at [20]
<www.justice.govt.nz>. For the earlier practice of the
Refugee Status Appeals Authority see Practice
Note 1/2008 (11 September 2008) <www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz
>. The Immigration and Protection Tribunal Regulations 2010
(SR2010/355), reg 14 requires the IPT to arrange for “an independent
interpreter” to attend an oral hearing of the IPT if it considers that
an independent interpreter is reasonably required for the purpose of
the oral hearing. An “independent interpreter” is defined as
meaning a person who the IPT considers is competent to translate
English into a foreign language that the appellant can understand and
speak and to translate that foreign language into English; and is
impartial. The analogue for the Refugee Status Appeals Authority
is to be found in the Immigration (Refugee Processing) Regulations 1999
(SR1999/285), reg 20. The issue of independence of interpreters
in the New Zealand RSD process is examined by Sabine Fenton in Expressing a Well-Founded Fear:
Interpreting in Convention Refugee Hearings (2001)
<www.refugee.org.nz>.
30. See Immigration
Act 2009, ss 228
and 229.
31. See Immigration
Act 2009, s
230. This duty exists also at common law. See for example Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration
[1980] 2 NZLR 130 (CA).
32. AB v Refugee Status Appeals Authority
[2001] NZAR 209 (Nicholson J).
33. The duty of
confidentiality is
found in the Immigration Act 2009, ss 151 and 152. The subject is
addressed in greater detail later in this paper.
34. See for example
Refugee Appeal No. 72668/01
[2002]
NZAR 649 (NZRSAA) at [45].
35. Attorney-General v Tamil X [2010]
NZSC 107 (NZSC) at [37].
36. Sakran v Minister of Immigration
(High Court Christchurch, CIV2003-409-001876, 22 December 2003, William
Young J).
37. See Refugee Appeal No. 1/92 Re SA (30
April 1992) (NZRSAA) <www.refugee.org.nz>.
38. James C
Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status
(1991,
Butterworths) at 86.
39. AA v Refugee Status Appeals Authority
(High Court Auckland, CIV2006-404-7974, 29 June 2007, Harrison J).
40.
A v Chief Executive of the Department of Labour (High Court
Auckland, CIV2004-404-6314, 19 October 2005, Winkelmann J) at [36].
41. See Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 (7 July
2004); [2005] NZAR 60 (NZRSAA) and Refugee
Appeal No. 76044 (11 September 2008); [2008] NZAR 719 (NZRSAA).
42. See Santokh Singh v Refugee Status Appeals
Authority (High Court Auckland, M1224/93, 9 February 1994,
Smellie J) where approximately ten to fifteen minutes before the appeal
hearing the lawyer (who was blind) was handed a magazine article and an
earlier decision of the tribunal which addressed the competence of
militant groups in Punjab to track potential victims throughout India
and the availability of an internal protection alternative.
During the hearing the tribunal put to the claimant matters raised in
the two documents and no request for an adjournment was made.
Counsel later regretted this decision. On judicial review it was
held that adequate notice had not been given because the full
significance of the earlier decision on the internal protection
alternative had not been apparent and more than ten to fifteen minutes
had been required to allow analysis and assessment of the
information. A rehearing was ordered.
43. A v Chief Executive of the Department of
Labour (High Court Auckland, CIV2004-404-6314, 19 October 2005,
Winkelmann J) at [48] and [52].
44. See Immigration
Act 2009, s 7
for the meaning of “classified information”.
45. See Immigration
Act 2009, ss 33,
35 and 36.
46. See Immigration
Act 2009, s
38(1) and (2).
47. See Immigration
Act 2009, s
38(3).
48. For the
specific provisions
affecting the deployment of classified information in the context of
hearings before the Immigration and Protection Tribunal, see
Immigration Act 2009, Part 7, particularly ss 241 to 244. The
role of the special advocate in the classified information context is
discussed by John Ip in “Adoption of the Special Advocate Procedure in
New Zealand’s Immigration Bill” [2009] NZ Law Review 207.
49. See Immigration
Act 2009, ss 151
and 152. The not dissimilar provisions of the earlier Immigration
Act 1987, s 129T were considered in Attorney-General
v X [2008] NZSC 48; [2008] 2 NZLR 579 (NZSC) and in Refugee Appeal No. 76204 [Publication of
Decision] [2009] NZAR 745 (NZRSAA).
50. See Immigration
Act 2009, s 354.
51. See Immigration
Act 2009, ss
151(2) and 152(1).
52. See Immigration
Act 2009, s
245(1).
53. The proceedings
must be
commenced not later than 28 days after the date on which the person
concerned is notified of the decision, unless the High Court decides
that, by reason of special circumstances, further time should be
allowed. See Immigration Act 2009, s 247(1).
54. See Immigration
Act 2009, s
247(2).
55. Chief Constable of the North Wales Police
v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155 at 1173 (HL).
56. The author
wishes to acknowledge
with gratitude the substantial assistance he has received from Pamela
Anderson, Branch Manager, Refugee Research & Information Branch,
Department of Labour, New Zealand in drafting this section of the paper
. All enquiries about the RRIB should be addressed to Pamela
Anderson at <Pamela.Anderson@dol.govt.nz>.
57. For a brief
account of the
library’s early years see Eleanor Hamlyn, “Spotlight on the New Zealand
Refugee Status Library” Library Life
253 (February 2001) 28.
58. Participating
states in the IGC
are Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Spain,
Switzerland, United States of America, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom.
59. As to the EU
context see, for
example, the papers cited at footnote 3 above.
60. Because this is
a deeply
entrenched and fundamental principle of the common law duty of fairness
it can be said with confidence that the same approach will be taken by
the Immigration and Protection Tribunal. See further Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration
[1980] 2 NZLR 130 (CA).
61. Compare the
Nationality,
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (UK), s 107(3) (added in April 2003) by
which practice directions may “require the Tribunal to treat a
specified decision of the Tribunal as authoritative in respect of a
particular matter”. See further PO
(Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011]
EWCA Civ 132 at [48] to [50] per Carnwath LJ.
62. For the most
recent formulation
of the internal protection alternative in New Zealand, see Refugee Appeal No. 76044 (11
September 2008); [2008] NZAR 719 at [95] to [188] (NZRSAA).
Further reference should be made to James Hathaway and Michelle Foster
“Internal protection/relocation/flight alternative as an aspect of
refugee status determination” in Feller, Türk & Nicholson
(eds) Refugee Protection in
International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International
Protection (2003) 357 as well as to The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal
Protection Alternative (1999) 21 Mich. J. Int’l L. 131.
Those Guidelines properly reflect the principles applied in New Zealand.
63. Santokh Singh v Refugee Status Appeals
Authority (High Court Auckland, M1224/93, 9 February 1994,
Smellie J).
64. Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; (2003) 216
CLR 473 McHugh and Kirby JJ at [58].
65. Natasha
Tsangarides The Refugee Roulette:
The Role of Country
Information in Refugee Status Determination (2010), Immigration
Advisory Service at p 66 <www.iasuk.org>. For a
further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the country
guidance system in the UK see Robert Thomas Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeals:
A Study of Tribunal Adjudication (2011, Hart) at Chapter 7.
66. See KH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 887; [2009] Imm AR 139 (CA) at
[2] per Sedley LJ.
67. See AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 (HL) at [27] to
[30].
68. See KH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 887; [2009] Imm AR 139 (CA) at
[3] per Sedley LJ.
69. Ibid at [4].
70. FB (Democratic Republic of Congo) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 457;
[2008] Imm AR 589 (CA).
71. Ibid at [15]
and [21].
72. The country
guidance system was
adopted formally in 2003. As at 29 March 2011 there were 316 current country guidance decisions
relating to 58 countries (though the overall total of CG decisions was
479 relating to 65 countries). See List of Country Guideline Determinations
at <www.tribunals.gov.uk>. The resources required to
maintain a system of this magnitude must be weighed against the
benefits claimed to be derived. In this context note the
following observation made by Robert Thomas in Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeals:
A Study of Tribunal Adjudication (2011, Hart) at 223:
Other concerns with
the country guidance process have concerned the amount of time that
particular country issues take to get finally resolved and the actual
effectiveness of such guidance once issued. Country guidance
issues can often be challenged in the higher courts and then sent back
and forth between them and the Tribunal. The classic example is
provided by the extraordinary country guidance litigation over returns
to Zimbabwe. Over a four year period, the Tribunal issued four
country guidance decisions on the safety of returnees to Zimbabwe after
successive remittals by the Court of Appeal.
73. The making of
asylum policy
through country guidance needs to be acknowledged. See further
Robert Thomas in Administrative
Justice and Asylum Appeals: A Study of Tribunal Adjudication
(2011, Hart) at 201-202. See also Natasha Tsangarides “The
Politics of Knowledge: An Examination of the Use of Country Information
in the Asylum Determination Process” (2009) 23 Immigration, Asylum and
Nationality Law 252.
74. See for example
PO (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for
the
Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 132 where “deep unease” was
expressed at the way in which the evidence of the claimant’s expert was
rejected in favour of an email tendered by the Home Office. The
latter was described as “a flimsy basis for the conclusions to which it
led”. See Maurice Kay LJ at [24]. The very length and
complexity of country guidance cases can be a substantial impediment to
their proper application and indeed to an accurate identification of
the points determined. See Carnwath LJ at [54] to [56].
75. See for example
Heaven Crawley
“Refugees and Gender: Law and Process” (2001, Jordans) at [10.5].
76. See for example
Brian Whitaker Unspeakable Love: Gay
and Lesbian Life in
the Middle East (2006, University of California Press) and Ann
Jones Kabul in Winter: Life without
Peace in Afghanistan (2006, Metropolitan Books).
77. KH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 887; [2009] Imm AR 139
(CA) at [4] per Sedley LJ.
78. These dangers
are illustrated by
PO (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 132 at [32] to [43] per
Maurice Kay LJ. For a discussion of other problems inherent in
applying country guidance cases see Robert Thomas in Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeals:
A Study of Tribunal Adjudication (2011, Hart) at 214-220.
79. See Robert
Thomas in Administrative Justice and
Asylum Appeals:
A Study of Tribunal Adjudication (2011, Hart) at 234.
80. See
<www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz>.
81. Search
conducted on 23 March
2011.
82. Adan v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2001] 2 AC 477 (HL) .
83. See for example
Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93 Re GJ
[1998] INLR 387 (whether sexual orientation qualifies as a ground for
“being persecuted”) followed and applied in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte
Shah [1999] 2 AC 629, 643D (HL); Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 [2005]
NZAR 60; [2005] INLR 68 (whether gays can be denied recognition as
refugees on the basis that they can be required to be “discreet”)
referred to with approval in four of the judgments given in HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 (SC); and Refugee Appeal No. 70366/96 Re C
[1997] 4 HKC 236 referred to in Adan
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] 1 AC 293,
307A (HL).
84. See also the
discussion in
Robert Thomas Administrative Justice
and Asylum Appeals: A Study of Tribunal Adjudication (2011,
Hart) at 146-147.
85. There is now a
substantial body
of literature on the subject. Useful reference can be made to
Gregor Noll (ed) Proof, Evidentiary
Assessment and Credibility in Asylum Procedures (2005, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers); Michael Kagan “Is Truth in the Eye of the
Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status
Determination” (2003) 17 Geo. Immigr. LJ 367 and Hilary Evans Cameron
“Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory” (2010) 22 IJRL
469.
86. Daniel L
Schacter The Seven Sins of Memory:
How the Mind
Forgets and Remembers (2001, Houghton Mifflin Company) at 9.
87. Hilary Evans
Cameron “Refugee
Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory” (2010) 22 IJRL 469.
88. Stephen Sedley
“Asylum: Can the
Judiciary Maintain its Independence?” in IARLJ Stemming the Tide or Keeping the Balance -
The Role of the Judiciary (2002) 319 at 324.
89. Natasha
Tsangarides “The
Politics of Knowledge: An Examination of the Use of Country Information
in the Asylum Determination Process” (2009) 23 Immigration, Asylum and
Nationality Law 252. The author at 253 correctly points out that
“[t]he production of knowledge is inherently political, embedded in
social and cultural processes that involve power relations and
subjectivity”. She argues that “... the accessibility to, and
selection and use of information necessarily involve subjective
processes, which deflate any attempt at denoting such information as
objective”. Her point at p 263 is that “... there is a need for
the acknowledgement of the limitations of COI, namely its ability to
establish certainty or fact, which should be expressed through
heightened analysis of COI amongst stakeholders. It calls for the
recognition of the subjectivity involved in knowledge production,
interpretation and use”.
90. Walter Lippmann
Public Opinion (1998, with a
new
introduction by Michael Curtis, Transaction Publishers) at xvi and 16.
91. See also Robert
F Barsky Constructing a Productive
Other: Discourse
Theory and the Convention Refugee Hearing (1994, John Benjamins
Publishing Company).